A ROMAN POST-MORTEM

An Inquest on the Fall of the Roman Republic

Todd Memorial Lecture
No. 3 (1950)

BY

RONALD SYME, M.A., F.B.A.
Camden Professor of Ancient History at the University of Oxford

SYDNEY
AUSTRALASIAN MEDICAL PUBLISHING CO. LTD.
1950

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AN INQUEST ON THE FALL OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC

MR. VICE-CHANCELLOR, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

Coming among you in response to an amicable and flattering invitation, namely to deliver the third of the Todd Memorial Lectures, I cannot feel myself wholly among strangers. Nor, I trust, will the theme selected for the discourse be altogether remote and unfamiliar. The series which opened so auspiciously with the *Aristocratic Epoch in Latin Literature* and went on to *The Emperor and his Clients* announces a high standard for emulation—and it also counsels the choice of a subject that shall deal not with books and texts and words only, but with the behaviour of men and governments.

When a war has been lost, a political system overthrown or an empire shattered and dispersed, there is certain to be a post-mortem enquiry, and the discussion is seldom closed with the decease of the survivors: it may be perpetuated to distant ages, and, as strife is the father of all things, so is dispute and contention the soul of history. One of these great necrological argumentations is the fall of the Roman Empire in the West—a revolution, so the historian Gibbon pronounced, "which will ever be remembered, and is still felt, by the nations of the earth".

Another is the fall of the Roman Republic. Here the breach between the old and the new was not, it is true, so wide, and the damage was quickly repaired, with a stable order ensuing. The Republic had been far from Republican, and the new dispensation under the rule of Caesar Augustus was not wholly monarchical. Behind the political struggles in the last age of the Free State at Rome, and behind the story of wars and battles, can be discerned, as a steady process, the emergence of centralized government.

The process is intelligible, but the causes of it and the stages are a perpetual theme for diagnosis and debate among scholars and historians. Perhaps the time has come to go back and discover what the Romans themselves thought about the catastrophe. Who was to blame? There were plenty of survivors, and the last convulsion was recent indeed to the contemporaries of Caesar Augustus. It opened in the year 49 B.C., when Julius Caesar, the proconsul of Gaul, invaded Italy, it went on through civil wars and the despotic government of the Triumvirate, and it closed in 31, when the last of the war-lords, Caesar's heir, was victorious at the Battle of Actium. Already in 28 and 27 B.C. the shape of the new order, the Principate, was receiving public and legal definition.

Yet it is not at all easy to recapture the tone and arguments of the debate. No single and explicit statement exists anywhere. The written history of the time has vanished utterly, no political speech survives, no pamphlet, no memoirs. Compared with what went before and what came after, the Age of Augustus acquires the paradoxical dignity of an obscure and highly controversial period. Recourse must be had to official documents—with due caution; to the Augustan poets—again with due caution. And silence itself will be revealing. Important truths are often awkward truths, to be covered and disguised, from fear, from complicity, or for comfort.

The inquest may now begin. After a political catastrophe, why not turn round and inculpate the political system? A facile escape. It was denied to the Romans. The Republic was the very essence of Rome, it had endured through five centuries. Senate and people broke the Samnites, defied Hannibal, the Carthaginians, and brought down the successors of Alexander in the kingdoms of the East. Greeks might assert primacy in the arts and sciences, but not in the art of government. They might appeal to the wisdom of ancient legislators. In vain: their inferiority was registered by the turbulence of their civic history, and not least by the suspicious consolation of political utopias. The Romans could assert a

powerful counter-claim. Their constitution was created, not out of plan or theory, not by one man only, but by long generations and by the efforts of many statesmen.[1] Here in truth was the balanced and ideal commonwealth: to discern which was not beyond the power even of a Greek, if he travelled, learned practical wisdom—and discarded national conceit.

To indict the Republican system of government was not only painful and intolerable: at the most a Roman was prepared to recognize imperfections of detail, or the need for adjustments. Moreover, it argued a lack of courage and faith. Caesar Augustus had just restored the rule of Senate and people, taking for himself powers by delegation. Not King or Dictator, but Princeps.[2] For that act the First Citizen has been much praised, then and subsequently. The reasons that moved the master of the legions were not wholly sentimental or traditional. A legal definition of the supreme authority was attractive, indeed inevitable. It enabled Augustus to control and work the constitution more effectively, to check the ambitions of others, to canalize patronage, and to provide for the undisturbed transmission of the power.

The Republic being to the Romans both a necessary mechanism and a necessary way of thought, and therefore invulnerable, might not the recent calamities be put down to the fault of the governing class? What an opportunity for a rancorous democrat, what a theme for anger and invective! He might attack the aristocracy for their reckless ambition, careless of the commonwealth; he might arraign the shameless nepotism that protected and rewarded the feeblest members of their own order; he might denounce military incompetence, consigning thousands of Roman citizens to their deaths in the pursuit of glory and conquest; and he might round off the indictment with corruption, vice and rapacity.

How the thing could be done, a retired politician had recently demonstrated. The historian Sallust in his narration of the Conspiracy of Catilina launched a general attack upon the oligarchy that governed Rome in the last age of the Republic. His technique, varying but concentrated to one

purpose, is instructive. Sulla, by victory in civil wars, by violence and by confiscation, brought the *nobilitas* back to power. Sulla is therefore regarded by Sallust as the author of all evil.[3] Catilina had been one of Sulla's men; the criminal ambitions of Catilina are made out to be a natural and inevitable product of the system that Sulla established.

But the historian has an even more damaging device. Cato was the firmest champion of that government, he waged a strong war in its defence against all subversive elements, and in the end he died for the Republic, achieving renown and consecration as a martyr in the cause of *Libertas*: Cato refused to submit to the victor in civil war, and preferred suicide to enslavement. Now Sallust in his monograph produces a speech by Cato in the Senate. It calls for the ultimate penalty against Catilina and his associates, and it carries a strong and bitter denunciation of sloth, greed and iniquity against that party of which Cato was himself one of the leaders.

Cato reminded his audience how Rome had grown great in ancient days through valour, integrity and justice; now, however, the State was poor and individuals were prosperous; the love of riches engendered the love of ease and luxury. Everything could be had for money or influence. Palaces and estates, wealth, possessions and works of art, all were dearer to their owners than was the Commonwealth.[4] Not only that. The conspiracy, in Cato's words, had been engineered by men of birth and family—*"coniuravere nobilissimi cives"*.[5]

And finally, the supreme condemnation of the aristocracy; not luxury or crime, but mediocrity. Sallust composes a tribute to the contrasted excellences of Cato and of Caesar. What is his justification? Because, he says, Cato and Caesar were the only truly great men at Rome in their age.[6]

Whether the aristocracy deserved so savage a handling might be doubted. There was still virtue and capacity in the old families—and no monopoly of honesty (very far from it) in the commercial classes. What, on a narrow and partisan estimate, is construed as luxury or corruption may yet be a

manifestation of vitality; and the last age of the Republic, with much turbulence, enjoyed freedom of speech and produced a great flowering of oratory and poetry. It might have been more equitable to absolve the governing class as a whole, to turn the edge of censure against a venal plebs, rapacious businessmen, the intrigues of bankers, the political apathy of the middle class in the towns of Italy—and the exorbitant ambitions of the generals.

Irrelevant, however, is the incrimination or exculpation of the aristocracy as a class. Privilege had always existed; it belonged to the natural order of things. If privilege was asserted and exploited by those on top, it was accepted and admired by those beneath.[7] Rome had gone through a revolutionary process. But none of the leaders of parties most active therein fought to change the structure of society—only to augment their own rank, wealth and power.

Nor could it have been expedient to attack or criticize the aristocracy under the new order of Caesar Augustus. The Revolution, now consolidated, was all for stability and conservation. Augustus for his ordering of the Roman State required not only the fabric of the Republic but the men and the families. They were to adorn the first ranks of the government, they were to act as leaders in society—and they were to be used in Augustus' own system of a monarchy that should be supported by an elaborate nexus of dynastic alliances in the aristocracy. In the civil wars he had fought against the *nobiles*. Victorious, and now a legitimate ruler, he became their friend and patron.

In the wars, the brave men and the loyal had perished, fighting in defence of the Republic against military despotism. Their names stand on record; but many of the most illustrious families in the Roman aristocracy are absent from the roll of honour of the Republic's dead. In fact, they survived the age of tribulation, and, for the most part, were ready to come to terms with the victor, for their mutual advantage.[8] What destroyed the *nobilitas* was not the wars of the Revolution but the murderous peace of the Caesars.

To the heirs of the *nobilitas,* the Roman people were pledged (so it was widely held) to pay a tribute in return for the great services of their ancestors.[9] The Emperor now came to replace the People as the source of honours. Augustus by control of the elections abated the dangerous excesses of open political competition, and, by favour, accorded to the *nobiles* a preferential treatment. He also subsidized them with money grants; and by his bounty he rescued from obscurity ancient houses of the aristocracy which through misfortune or incompetence had long ago fallen out of the race for honours and glory. Names never heard of for centuries now return to adorn the roll of the Republic's magistrates, and with the passage of a few years the new monarchy which grew out of the Revolution exhibits a strongly aristocratic complexion, patrician houses like Claudii, Valerii, Fabii, and Cornelii being prominent in the consulate.[10]

The *nobiles* might regain prestige, but not such power as before. They had once behaved in war and peace with all the pride and independence of clan-chieftains or barons. It was now intended that they should be useful as well as decorative. Moreover, they were not allowed a monopoly: they had to share privilege and station with the new men emergent from the Revolution, the adherents of Augustus promoted and enriched for loyalty and service.

If the aristocracy had to surrender much of its real power, and abate its ambitions, all the greater was the temptation to insist upon the show and the trappings, to advertise the claims of birth and pedigree. More so, perhaps, than in the last epoch of the Republic. And in those aspirations of the nobility the new men might easily concur. They had every reason to support and magnify that station and rank to which they had recently been admitted; they cheerfully adopted its pretensions and its prejudices. Social mimicry is the constant accompaniment of political success. Dual though it is in origin, the new aristocracy of the Empire pays homage to the same ideals.

Since the governing class as a whole, the past along with the present, was thus protected from attack, it would be necessary to look for individual culprits. Might not some of the political leaders be incriminated, for pride and ambition, for blunders or incompetence, for the fatal refusal to make concessions and adjustments?

Cato in his own life-time had incurred blame for that inflexible spirit (or noble obstinacy) which denied all compromise and sometimes appeared to harm the cause he was defending.[11] Moreover, Cato might deserve some share of responsibility for the clash of arms in which the Republic perished. Cato, it might have been said, was not merely a man of principle—he was a tenacious and astute politician. If he came in the end to support Pompeius the Great against Caesar, it was not from illusions about Pompeius. His preference was tactical—to break Caesar first, then Pompeius, if it could be done.[12]

Cato failed. But Cato through defeat and suicide became a force more potent than ever in his life-time. There was hardly a Roman that could resist the spell.[13] Even his political enemies, such as Sallust, were quickly constrained to pay homage to his memory—and even Augustus could invoke Cato, in the interests of political stability and conservatism. Cato, it was said, preferred any government rather than none; and one of Cato's loyal followers proclaimed that even submitting to tyranny was better than civil war.[14] Now Augustus was of the opinion that it was better to have imperfect laws and abide by them than be always changing;[15] when asked his opinion of Cato, he had an answer: "anybody who will not want the existing order to be altered is a good man and a good citizen";[16] and Augustus actually wrote a pamphlet on the subject of Cato.[17] The purpose and the argument do not lie beyond conjecture—a sermon on stable government.

Cato was dead and sanctified when Caesar's heir was making his debut as a military adventurer. Not so Brutus and Cassius. They were his sworn enemies. Augustus, for all his tolerance, good sense, or duplicity, could hardly have

been expected to rehabilitate the memory of Brutus and Cassius. Those men had assassinated his adoptive parent, they had been duly condemned to death by a court of law. Nobody else, however, was debarred from extolling Brutus and Cassius. It was generally recognized that the cause for which Brutus and Cassius fought at Philippi was the better cause. The best men were there also: they, or their sons, avowed it proudly under the rule of Augustus.[18] Devotion to the memory of the Liberators had not yet become a symptom or a proof of disaffection with the rule of the Caesars.

There remains Cicero, who was killed when standing in defence of the Republic, but who was not regarded by Republicans quite as one of themselves, either then or in his posthumous reputation. The political career of the great orator was open to damaging criticism on various counts. More often, it is true, for compliance than for obstinacy. Yet if Cicero might seem by his end amply to have redeemed himself from earlier weaknesses, there might well be two opinions about the wisdom of a policy that invoked civil war in the defence of the Commonwealth: to destroy Marcus Antonius, Cicero in the last year of his life raised up the young man, Caesar's heir, an adventurer with a private army.

That young man, a few months later, was one of the three who signed the death-warrant of Cicero. A shameful act, but one among many such acts. What, then, would be said or thought about Cicero when the era of the war was closed and Rome enjoyed concord and stability under the rule of Caesar Augustus? It was a delicate question then, and no single answer is now available.

Previously it had not been necessary to discredit the memory of Cicero (there was no Ciceronian party in Roman politics), the times changed quickly, and the contest for the supreme power with Marcus Antonius afforded (and required) more powerful weapons of propaganda. After the victory Cicero's memory was even less a political issue, and silence was the best remedy.[19]

But the name of that Roman who so excelled in oratory as to be a worthy rival to Demosthenes could not always be avoided; and the historian of the civil wars would have to pronounce a verdict somewhere. A fragment survives, preserving the obituary notice as composed by Livy. It is sympathetic but balanced. Except in his death, Cicero did not bear adverse fortune as a man should; and as for his death, he suffered only what he would have inflicted on others had he been victorious in the struggle.[20]

An anecdote is instructive. Plutarch tells how Augustus one day came upon one of his grandsons reading a book of Cicero. The boy in dismay made fruitless attempts to conceal it. Augustus took the volume, stood there reading it for some time, and gave it back with the words: "a great writer, and a great patriot".[21]

The Princeps, it should seem, need not have confined his approbation within the walls of the palace. He could praise Cato if he chose, in the interests of ordered government: why not Cicero? Cicero was a champion of enlightened conservatism. There was much of value in his political thinking; and the ideal commonwealth which he depicted in the books *De re publica* drew its strength not from theory but from history, for it was nothing less than an exposition, with suitable embellishments (but no structural modification), of the Roman state in a past age of stability and felicity.[22]

That Caesar Augustus had recourse for guidance to the writings of Cicero, or to any writings, is not a convincing notion. That the phraseology employed by Cicero (and no doubt by many of Cicero's contemporaries) should recur in the Principate of Caesar Augustus can hardly prove anything more than the recurrence, in familiar and useful words, of political argumentation—and political deceit. The Augustan system took its origin from facts, not from books; its authors were politicians, diplomats and generals, not theorists.

So much for the political leaders on the Republican side. For one reason or another it was impossible to make scapegoats of Cato, of Brutus, of Cicero. Flagrant by contrast

was the guilt of the military leaders who subverted the Commonwealth by their ambition and brought on the civil wars by their rivalries. In the opinion of Cato the trouble began, not when Caesar crossed the Rubicon but when, a dozen years earlier, Pompeius, Crassus and Caesar formed a compact to control the State.[23] That opinion found favour and support: Asinius Pollio adopted the year 60 B.C. for the beginning of his history.[24]

Yet the three dynasts were not totally or unreservedly to be condemned. They were men of splendour and power, they exhibited *"virtus"* and they pursued *"gloria"*. If they augmented the dominions of the Roman people, they would have to be honoured at Rome—and Augustus paid suitable and especial honour to his predecessors in that role.[25]

Of the three, Crassus failed in his war beyond the Euphrates, and so could properly be blamed for criminal aggression. But Pompeius and Caesar were resplendently successful in their conquests. Caesar was consecrated by the heir to his name, yet by paradox *"Divi filius"* when undisputed master of Rome seems to award the preference not to his parent but to Pompeius Magnus. The evidence is startling; it is consistent; and it comes from the three great writers of Augustan Rome that stand so close to the government—two poets and a historian.

In the *Odes* of Horace, Julius Caesar is not quite referred to as a person.[26] The *Aeneid* of Virgil is an epic poem devoted to the ultimate origins of Rome and the Julian House, highly symbolical and allegorical. Augustus is not only prefigured in Aeneas: he is revealed in three visions of the future. First, *The Promise of Jupiter*. To comfort Venus, the father of gods and men discloses the glory that is to be, its culmination in the young Caesar, conqueror of the nations to the world's end and a prince of peace.[27] Next, *The Shield of Aeneas,* with all Roman history portrayed as leading up to the victory of Rome and of Italy at Actium.[28] Thirdly, *The Revelation of Anchises*: the parent of Aeneas calls up before him in the lower world the muster roll of Aeneas' line and of the heroes

of Rome, regal and Republican, down to *"Augustus Caesar divi genus"*, who will establish the Golden Age in Italy.[29]

Where is Julius Caesar? The list passes from Romulus to Augustus, but he is nowhere to be found in that vicinity. Caesar is segregated, being introduced later, along with Pompeius. Both stand outside of the chronological order of Roman history, and neither is referred to by name. That is not the most remarkable thing. Anchises with solemn adjuration exhorts them both to refrain from civil war. Which shall disarm first? Not Pompeius but Caesar.[30]

The historian confirms the poet. For Livy it was a question whether the birth of Caesar were a greater blessing or a greater curse.[31] And Livy was so generous in his praise of Pompeius that Augustus called him a *"Pompeianus"*. That did not, we are told, in any way impair the friendship between emperor and historian.[32] On the contrary, these men understood each other. Livy was quite sincere; and the exaltation of Pompeius, so far from offending Caesar Augustus, fitted admirably with his policy.

Whatever was known and remembered about the acts and ambitions of Pompeius the Great could be passed over: in the end he had fallen at Pharsalus commanding the armies of the Republic against Caesar. Whereas Caesar (whatever the rights and wrongs of the dispute) began an accursed war by his invasion of Italy; and Caesar the Dictator had been assassinated by honourable men.

It was expedient for Augustus to dissociate himself from Caesar: the one destroyed the Republic, the other restored it. How could that be done? Easily, and with the fairest pretext. Caesar had been deified, he was no longer a mortal man. When Caesar's heir himself died at the term of his long presidency of the Roman State, there were carried in the funeral procession the images of his ancestors, and also those of the great generals of the past. Pompeius Magnus was among them, but not Caesar.[33] The artifice of Augustus is patent. He exploited the divinity of his parent and paraded

the titulature of *"Divi filius"*. For all else, Caesar the proconsul and dictator was better forgotten.

An authentic scapegoat has been identified. And there were others. Upon Octavianus' partners in the triumviral powers, Aemilius Lepidus and Marcus Antonius, might be laid the responsibility for the proscriptions, and notably upon Antonius the guilt of the murder of Cicero. For the rest, Lepidus was a flimsy character, rapidly discarded, and by his very insignificance at the same time removed from blame and unworthy of rehabilitation. Not so the great Antonius, the true author of the Caesarian victory at Philippi and the rival of Caesar's heir in the supreme struggle for the dominion of the world.

The war of words began before the armed decision at Actium, and it was prosecuted afterwards, with no less intensity. Not only was it Antonius' fault, the renewed civil war—for his rival (it was claimed) wanted only peace, concord and the restoration of Republican government. Not only criminal ambition, but criminal folly. Antonius had now become an oriental monarch, aspiring to subjugate Rome and Italy to foreign rule. His habits were alien, his armies, his allies—and the Queen of Egypt his wife, *"sequiturque (nefas) Aegyptia coniunx"*.[34]

The war as managed by Caesar's heir was a war solemnly and legally declared against Egypt. If Antonius stood by Cleopatra, he was stamped as a traitor and consigned to infamy. And so it turned out. The legend of Actium is a familiar theme, lavishly exploited by the Augustan poets.

After Caesar, Antonius is the second scapegoat, and much more satisfactory in the intensity of the emotion evoked, moral, patriotic and xenophobic.

None the less, the account is not closed when Caesar and Antonius are indicted. Attractive though it might be to single out one man (or two) for execration, and an easy solution for the vulgar and the superficial, a scrupulous enquirer or a thoughtful patriot would have to confess that

the evil was deeper in its roots and more pervasive in its manifestations. Though it was hardly possible (as has been shown) to incriminate the whole governing class, they might share the guilt if it was nation-wide, and envisaged as moral and religious rather than political.

Through what sins and transgressions had the Roman People come so near to destruction? Various answers were available. An ancestral curse was working itself out: it originated in Troy, or at the founding of Rome when Romulus shed his brother's blood.[35] Or the national gods had been neglected, their sanctuaries crumbling in ruin.[36] Or the traditional ideals of morality and frugality had lapsed, generation after generation sinking deeper in luxury, crime and corruption.[37]

The nation's guilt and the urgent need for a reformation are most eloquently declared in certain odes of Horace, which herald and support the social programme of Caesar Augustus. How far that programme succeeded is a large question. A historian a century later expresses his doubts; according to Cornelius Tacitus, luxury was unbridled from the War of Actium down to the fall of Nero.[38]

Nor, be it noted, was the moral outlawry of Caesar and of Antonius maintained in all its rigour. After a few years, it seems, the anger and the fervour about Actium abated in the consciousness of stability and prosperity. And the family of the renegade subsisted as an element in the Caesarian dynasty. The daughters of Antonius were at the same time nieces of Augustus, and from this line came three emperors of Rome—Caligula, Claudius and Nero.

There were no personal and family causes of this nature to rehabilitate the memory of Caesar the Dictator. Justice was late in coming. As the years passed, however, the origins of the Empire could be seen in a proper perspective; and a historian might be inclined to replace Caesar in the series of the rulers of Rome, for various reasons, and especially if he were distrustful of Augustus and of Augustan valuations.

Tacitus frequently refers to Caesar, and never with disrespect; and he is hostile to the idealization of Pompeius the Great.[39]

. . . . .

Such is the termination of the post-mortem, and not wholly conclusive. It provokes a further question. Was the corpse wholly defunct? If a man looked about him he might be impelled to doubt it, for he could see the outer fabric of the Republic intact, the old families back in office, and the old phrases back in currency. Much had altered, it is true, but not everything for the worse. Though everybody made haste to bury and cover up the twenty years of tribulation, the period had not in fact been an orgy of continuous destruction. There were not battles every year; and many of the battles had been decided with little bloodshed, through the well-timed treason of political generals or the mass capitulations of citizen soldiers. Even the standing armies, the savage taxation and the vast expropriations were not an unmixed evil: money circulated and energy was let loose.

Many of the profiteers of the wars became imperceptibly the profiteers of the peace. It is worth asking, which were the classes and regions to benefit from the centralized government that replaced the competitive anarchy of the Roman Republic? The answer can be briefly given.

The provincials gained protection from the master of Rome, and submitted to regular taxation in the place of arbitrary exactions. Caesar was also the patron of the urban poor, providing corn doles, and for some, allocations of land. The propertied class welcomed security and saw their estates rise in value. For business men the new régime held out new sources of investment, posts in the administration, and the prospect, if they wished it, of promotion into the senatorial order. As for the Senate itself, the lower members could now rise by merit or loyalty to the top, while the princes of the aristocracy, relieved from the expense and the dangers of competition for office, might qualify for the consulate by prerogative—through the patronage of Caesar Augustus.

However, not all men are ready frankly to acknowledge benefits conferred upon them. The Empire could be acclaimed by the provinces, the lower orders and by much of the middle class, commercial or landed. Not so easily by the aristocracy or by those who from tradition or snobbery were imbued by the same sentiments—or at least vocal in their expression.

The Empire needed no elaborate or sophistical justification to most classes and regions. Their feelings are known, or can be guessed. Imperial propaganda, as directed towards the inferior orders of society, might seem either superfluous or obvious and predictable. The upper classes needed a more subtle approach—or rather, it should be said, they gradually formulated the reasons and excuses for accepting the new order of things. How do men console themselves for the surrender of political freedom? With what arguments do they maintain that they have discovered the middle path, liberty without licence, discipline but not enslavement?[40] It would be an entertaining speculation, and not remote from the concern of the present age.

NOTES

[1] Such was the opinion of Cato the Censor, reproduced in Cicero, *De re publica* II, 2.

[2] Tacitus, *Ann.* I, 9: "non regno tamen neque dictatura sed principis nomine constitutam rem publicam."

[3] Sallust, *Bell. Cat.* XI, 4: "sed postquam L. Sulla armis recepta re publica, bonis initiis malos eventus habuit," etc.

[4] *Ib.* LII, 5: "sed per deos immortalis! vos ego appello, qui semper domos villas signa tabulas vostras pluris quam rem publicam fecistis"; *ib.* 21 f.: "sed alia fuere quae illos magnos fecere, quae nobis nulla sunt, domi industria, foris iustum imperium, animus in consulendo liber, neque delicto neque lubidini obnoxius. pro his nos habemus luxuriam atque avaritiam, publice egestatem, privatim opulentiam; laudamus divitias, sequimur inertiam."

[5] *Ib.* 24.

[6] *Ib.* LIII, 5: "multis tempestatibus haud sane quisquam Romae virtute magnus fuit. sed memoria mea ingenti virtute, divorsis moribus fuere viri duo M. Cato et C. Caesar."

[7] Cicero, *De re publica* I, 43: "tamen ipsa aequabilitas est iniqua, cum habet nullos gradus dignitatis." Pliny, *Epp.* IX, 5, 3: "nihil est ipsa aequalitate inaequalius."

[8] Tacitus, *Ann.* I, 2: "cum ferocissimi per acies aut proscriptione cecidissent, ceteri nobilium, quanto quis servitio promptior, opibus et honoribus extollerentur."

[9] Seneca, *De beneficiis* IV, 30, 4: "hic egregiis maioribus ortus est: qualiscumque est, sub umbra suorum lateat. ut loca sordida repercussu solis inlustrantur, ita inertes maiorum suorum luce resplendeant."

[10] To say nothing of a Furius Camillus after three and a half centuries, or a Quinctilius Varus descended from the nobility of Alba Longa.

[11] Cicero, *Ad Atticum* II, 1, 8: "nocet interdum rei publicae; dicit enim tamquam in Platonis πολιτείᾳ non tamquam in Romuli faece sententiam."

[12] Thus, when Pompeius was removed, Cato could prolong the struggle for *Libertas* against Caesar with a clear conscience. Cf. Lucan, *Pharsalia* IX, 265 f.:

"unum Fortuna reliquit
iam tribus e dominis."

[13] Compare the words of Velleius Paterculus, an ardent supporter of the Caesars (II, 35, 2): "homo Virtuti simillimus et per omnia ingenio diis quam hominibus propior."

[14] Plutarch, *Pompeius* 54; *Brutus* 12.

[15] Cassius Dio LIII, 10, 1.

[16] Macrobius II, 4,18: "quisquis praesentem statum civitatis commutari non volet, et civis et vir bonus est."

[17] Suetonius, *Divus Aug.* 85.

[18] Tacitus, *Ann.* IV, 34: "Messala Corvinus imperatorem suum Cassium praedicabat."

[19] Compare the opinion of Labienus, cited by the Elder Seneca (*Controv.* X, 3, 6): "optima civilis belli defensio oblivio est."

[20] Cited by the Elder Seneca (*Suas.* VI, 22): "omnium adversorum nihil ut viro dignum erat tulit praeter mortem, quae vere aestimanti minus indigna videri potuit quod a victore inimico ‹nil› crudelius passurus erat quam quod eiusdem fortunae compos victo fecisset."

[21] Plutarch, *Cicero* 49.

[22] As surely emerges from statements in the tract itself, confirmed by *De legibus* III, 4, 12.

[23] Plutarch, *Caesar* 13; *Pompeius* 47.

[24] Horace, *Odes* II, 1, 1 ff.:

"Motum ex Metello consule civicum
bellique causas et vitia et modos
ludumque Fortunae gravisque
principum amicitias et arma
nondum expiatis uncta cruoribus."

[25] Suetonius, *Divus Aug.* 31: "proximum a dis immortalibus honorem memoriae ducum praestitit, qui imperium p.R. ex minimo maximum reddidissent."

[26] The nearest he can go is the "Iulium sidus" of *Odes* I, 12, 47; the "Caesaris ultor" of I, 2, 44 is only a description of Augustus.

[27] *Aen.* I, 286 ff.:

"nascetur pulchra Troianus origine Caesar
imperium Oceano, famam qui terminet astris,
Iulius, a magno demissum nomen Iulo.
hunc tu olim spoliis Orientis onustum
accipies secura: vocabitur hic quoque votis."

[28] *Aen.* VIII, 678 f.:

"hinc Augustus agens Italos in proelia Caesar
cum patribus populoque penatibus et magnis dis."

[29] *Aen.* VI, 789 ff.:

"hic Caesar et omnis Iuli
progenies magnum caeli ventura sub axem:
hic vir, hic est, tibi quem promitti saepius audis,
Augustus Caesar divi genus, aurea condet
saecula qui rursus Latio."

[30] *Aen.* VI, 832 ff.:

"ne, pueri, ne tanta animis adsuescite bella
neu patriae validas in viscera vertite viris;
tuque prior, tu parce, genus qui ducis Olympo,
proice tela manu, sanguis meus!"

[31] Seneca, *Nat. Quaest.* V, 18, 4: "nam quod de Caesare maiori volgo dictatum est et a Tito Livio positum, in incerto esse utrum illum nasci magis rei publicae profuerit an non nasci, dici etiam de ventis potest."

[32] Tacitus, *Ann.* IV, 34: "Titus Livius, eloquentiae ac fidei praeclarus in primis, Cn. Pompeium tantis laudibus tulit ut Pompeianum eum Augustus appellaret; neque id amicitiae eorum offecit."

[33] Cassius Dio LVI, 34, 2 f.

[34] *Aen.* VIII, 685 ff.:

"hinc ope barbarica variisque Antonius armis,
victor ab Aurorae populis et litore rubro,
Aegyptum virisque Orientis et ultima secum
Bactra vehit, sequiturque (nefas) Aegyptia coniunx."

[35] E.g. Virgil, *Georgics* I, 501, ff.: Horace, *Odes* III, 3, 21 ff.

[36] Horace, *Odes* III, 6, 1 ff.

[37] *Ib.* 46 ff.

[38] Tacitus, *Ann.* III, 55 (a digression following the speech in which Tiberius Caesar expressed a strong dislike for moral and sumptuary legislation).

[39] Tacitus, *Hist.* II, 38: "post quos Cn. Pompeius occultior non melior"; and, especially notable because of the context, which deals with the legislation of Augustus, *Ann.* III, 28: "tum Cn. Pompeius tertium consul corrigendis moribus delectus, et gravior remediis quam delicta erant suarumque legum auctor idem ac subversor, quae armis tuebatur armis amisit."

[40] The formula is well attested, e.g. in the funeral oration upon Augustus (Cassius Dio LVI, 43, 4), and in the words of Galba when adopting Piso as his successor (Tacitus, *Hist.* I, 16): "neque enim hic, ut gentibus quae regnantur, certa dominorum domus et ceteri servi, sed imperaturus es hominibus qui nec totam servitutem pati possunt nec totam libertatem."